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Introduction
This article’s origin can be traced to reading, and 
reflecting on, a single essay.  In this case, the essay was 
Marci Cottingham’s (2015).  “The Terrible Towel and 
Fair-Weather Fans: Steelers Nation as a Quasi-Religion.” 
Based on Emile Durkheim’s work (1912/1965), 
Cottingham (2015) used a functionalist model to 
make the case that Pittsburgh Steelers fandom is, as 
her title suggests, a quasi-religion.  The “terrible towel” 
mentioned in the title of her essay, Cottingham (2015) 
argues, is a sacred object for Steelers fans.    
Before doing the research for this article, we paid 
reasonably close attention to the 2016 U. S. presidential 
campaigns.  Therefore, we were fairly confident that both 
Donald Trump’s and Hillary Clinton’s campaign had 
been led by someone who’d attained a kind of cult status 
among a substantial portion of the American populace. 
This observation led us to speculate that political 
campaigns themselves might be seen as quasi-religious 
in nature.  Subsequently, we read various other authors 
who had applied the concept of quasi-religion to sports 
(Brody 1979), back-to-land movements (Brinkerhoff 
and Jacob 1987), vegetarianism (Hamilton 2000), and 
conspiracy theories (Frank and Bauer 2013).  Based 
on these sources, it seemed that the concept might be 
fruitfully applied to political campaigns, as well.
Over time, both major candidates for the 2016 U. S. 
presidency were called out for being cult leaders. This 
calling out was frequently done by journalists who 
clearly disliked the candidates or their policies, writers 
who were using the term “cult leader” in a pejorative 
sense.  After the final presidential debate, for example, 
one conservative blogger inferred that “Clinton wants 
to be the leader of America’s suicide cult,” so dangerous 
were her economic, cultural, health, open borders and 
“vaccine” policies, among others (Adams 2016).  
Donald Trump, possibly because he was the eventual 
winner of the election, has perhaps garnered even 
more sustained attention as a potential cult leader. 
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Commentators pointed to his cult status even during 
the campaign.  Shortly after the Republican convention, 
for example, Rebecca Nelson picked up on what she saw 
as his messianic claim that the country was in “crisis” 
and that he—and only he—could get it back on track 
(2016).  She believed that this was clear evidence that 
he considered himself a cult leader and found evidence 
that many of his followers saw him that way as well. 
The claim that Trump followers constitute a “dangerous 
cult” has persisted after his election (e.g., Aslan 2017).1 
We thought that, if analysts like Cottingham could find 
evidence of quasi-religiosity among fans of a football 
team, then we might do so among those who participated 
in the campaigns of both Trump and Clinton.
As we read further, we discovered that the concept 
of politics as religion or quasi-religion already had 
a substantial pedigree (e.g., Durkheim 1965 [1912]; 
Eliade1987 [1957]; Gentile 2006; Le Bon 1960 [1895]; 
Mosca 2015 [1939]).  Mosca, considered a founder of 
modern political science, in his book The Ruling Class 
(1938/1980) suggested that political parties “ultimately 
are quasi-religions stripped of the divine element” (p. 
283).  Mosca believed that the ritualistic nature of parties 
and political movements is, like those of religious sects, 
used to manipulate the masses.  In fact, Mosca (1980: 
163-198) devoted a whole chapter to the similarities 
among “churches, parties and sects.” 
Historian of religion Mircea Eliade asserted in The 
Sacred and the Profane (1957/1959) that, although 
modern humans may see themselves as non-religious, 
“they still behave religiously, even though they are not 
aware of it” (1959: 204).  This behavior, he claims, can 
be seen in political movements, especially writ large. 
Eliade points, for example, to the ways Karl Marx used 
various religious myths to construct his view of history. 
For example, Marx used the myth of the Golden Age to 
derive his view of the classless society.  He used Judeo-
Christian messianic ideology to envision the “prophetic 
role and soteriological [world saving] function” of 
the proletariat.  Marx also used the myth of the battle 
between Good and Evil to predict the “total victory of 
the former” (1959: 206-207).  Eliade’s larger point was 
that even in modern, presumably secularized society, we 
find ourselves drawn to “little religions” and “political 
mystiques” (207).
Gustave Le Bon, an early social psychologist, 
provides a reason why.  Rather than emphasizing the 
1 Even Bernie Sanders, whose campaign we also examined but will 
not report on in detail here, drew fire for being a cult leader. Criticism 
sometimes came from people who actually liked him but who thought he 
was too self-centered for the good of party unity (e.g., Ambinder, 2016), 
especially as the Democratic party approached its nominating convention.
manipulative possibilities of political movements (and 
religions), as Mosca did, or the myths to which we are 
drawn, as Eliade did, Le Bon stressed how political 
movements meet the psychological needs of people. 
Le Bon claimed, in fact, that religion, in all its forms, 
stems from people’s need to submit themselves to some 
sort of faith.  This faith “may apply to an invisible God, 
to a wooden or stone idol, to a hero or to a political 
conception . . . [In all these cases] its essence remains 
religious” (Le Bon1960: 60).   Le Bon thought that 
modern societies, in which traditional religions tended 
to lose their hold on the masses, are fertile ground for 
secular religions like political movements, religions that 
enabled “crowds” to express and focus their need to 
believe.
Readers of this sociological journal may recall that 
Durkheim, in Elementary Forms of the Religious Life 
(1965/1915), suggested that religion has, as its functions, 
the elevation of people from their individual lives and 
connecting them to a collectivity to which they belong. 
Religion need not entail the presence of supernatural 
beings, because the divine, in Durkheim’s view, was 
the collectivity itself.  Durkheim argued that religion 
consists of three key elements: sacred objects or entities, 
ritual behaviors, and beliefs.  While Durkheim did not 
explicitly mention in Elementary Forms of Religious 
Life that the political elements of a society sometimes 
bleed into the religious, it is possible to imagine, as we 
propose, that such elements may acquire the kinds of 
sacred objects, ritual behaviors and beliefs that lead 
them to look suspiciously religious.  
To our knowledge, Emilio Gentile, was the first 
theorist that we know of to devote a whole book to 
viewing politics as religion.  In fact, his Politics as Religion 
(2006) argued explicitly that a political movement or 
regime becomes a religion when it:
a. [C]onsecrates the primacy of a secular 
collective entity by placing it at the center of a 
set of beliefs and myths . . .
b.   . . [I]mposes loyalty and devotion . . .
c.    . .[I]nterprets its political action as a 
messianic function to fulfill a mission of benefit 
to all humanity.
d.   Creates a political liturgy for the adoration 
of the sacralized collective entity through the 
cult of the person who embodies it . . . (138-
39).
Gentile studied fascism, as a form of political religion, 
particularly in Italy.  He concluded that there were 
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two types of politics as religion in the modern world. 
One was the political religion, which refers to the kind 
of sacralization of politics that occurs in totalitarian 
regimes.  In such regimes, political religion sanctifies 
the use of violence in the fight against political enemies, 
among other things.  The other type, civil religion, 
sacralizes politics in democratic regimes (Gentile, 2006: 
139 ff.). 
As far as we can tell, no one has looked seriously 
at political campaigns with an eye to whether they 
constitute quasi-religious movements.  This is the goal 
of the current article.
Methods
We examined Youtube, and other available, recordings 
of five campaign rallies each for Donald Trump and 
Hillary Clinton during the 2016 pre-election period.2 
We selected a purposive, nonprobability (e.g., non-
random) sample of the longest recordings we could find 
of rallies during 2016 for each candidate. Our rationale 
in doing this was that these recordings would give us the 
fullest picture of what typically went on in them. We list 
the campaign rallies that we watched in the Appendix 
at the end of this article.  Tracking down the origin 
of certain catch phrases, rituals and beliefs manifest 
at the campaign rallies frequently required additional 
observations, notably of the 2016 Democratic and 
Republican nominating conventions.  
We employed a mixed-method approach.  Primarily, 
we did a content analysis of the recordings.  As we 
watched them, we each took notes on three particular 
phenomena: sacred objects, rituals, and beliefs. These 
three phenomena were suggested by Durkheim’s classic 
(1915/1965) work and were used by Cottingham (2015) 
to organized her study of Pittsburgh Steelers fans, 
one hundred years later.  Durkheim defined sacred 
objects as “those which . . .  interdictions protect and 
isolate.”  He said rituals were “the rules of conduct 
which prescribe how a man should comport himself in 
the presence of sacred objects.” He also said “religious 
beliefs are representations which express the nature 
of sacred things and the relations which they sustain” 
(1915/1965: 56).  
To check whether some of the beliefs expressed by 
the candidates were shared by their followers, and not 
just the followers expressing approbation at rallies, 
2 We did the same for Bernie Sanders, but discovered that, because his 
campaign did not last to the end of the election year, it was not strictly 
comparable to the other two presidential candidates  We will briefly 
summarize our findings about the Sanders campaign at the end of the 
paper.
we supplemented our content analysis with statistical 
analyses of data about a probability sample of voters 
in the 2016 presidential election from the American 
National Election Study. 3 
Results
Having reviewed video recordings of five campaign 
rallies for the two major candidates—Donald Trump 
and Hillary Clinton--for the 2016 U. S. presidency, we 
are prepared to compare and contrast these recordings 
in terms of sacred objects, ritualistic behavior and the 
expression of fundamental beliefs.  In doing so, we, like 
Cottingham (2015) in her study of sports fans’ behavior, 
will frame these elements in terms of the degree of 
sacralization they evince.  We believe that, in the context 
of campaign rallies, one cannot dichotomously classify 
these elements as sacred or profane, but must place 
them on a continuum between these two extremes.
Sacred Objects
At one level, each of the campaigns seemed to have 
generated literal objects that held special meaning 
for pilgrims to the rallies.  The red “Make American 
Great Again” baseball-style caps worn often by Trump 
and many of his supporters may be the most easily 
remembered objects in the 2016 campaigns. However, 
the Trump campaign generated a substantial variety of 
other campaign-related paraphernalia—and, some of it, 
especially towards the end of the campaign, became a 
bit hostile.  
In January 2016 (at Rock Hill, South Carolina), 
there were relatively tame t-shirts (saying “Make 
America Great Again”) and posters (stating that “The 
Silent Majority Stands with Trump”).  By the time of 
the later rallies (at the end of October and in the first 
week of November), the hats were almost as likely to 
have the name Trump written on them or an American 
flag depicted on them.  The posters also became much 
more differentiated. These posters bore messages like 
“Trump-Pence,” which defined the constituency of 
their bearers (“Women for Trump” and “Veterans for 
Trump”), or that implied varying degrees of anger 
(“Drain the Swamp” and “Trump that Bitch”).
We debated about classifying people, candidates 
and surrogates, as sacred objects because we wanted 
to avoid objectifying any persons or group of people. 
We decided, however, that such a classification was 
3 These data are provided online through the Survey Documentation and 
Analysis posted by the University of California, Berkeley in 2017.
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unavoidable.  In our defense, we reiterate that theorists 
like Le Bon have paved the way for doing this.  Le Bon 
(1960: 60) suggested that religious faith “may apply to 
an invisible God, to a wooden or stone idol, [or] to a 
hero.”  He also pointed out that, occasionally, political 
candidates seem to invite such treatment.
To one degree or another, the goal of many political 
campaigns is to elevate people, usually the candidates 
themselves, to the level of sacred objects—and, in many 
cases, to portray others—often opponents—either as 
simply unholy or as devils incarnate.  Trump rallies 
provided many examples of both efforts.  At an October 
31 rally, for example, Trump was introduced by former 
college basketball coach Bobby Knight who said he 
thought of Trump as “Saint Donald.”  
Trump did not require surrogates to point out his 
near mythical status.  At earlier rallies, like one in Rock 
Hill, South Carolina, on January 18, 2016, he suggested 
that he, Cincinnatus-like4, had been chosen [by 
himself?] to lead a movement against the Washington 
establishment.  Trump stated: “I enjoyed my job [in real 
estate; on television?]; I did it well.”  He also implied that 
he would be willing to make this sacrifice (of seeking 
the presidency) for the people.  
On the other hand, Trump was famous for vilifying 
opponents.  Sometimes he did this with snide asides 
(as in the January rally where he chided his remaining 
Republican opponents as well as Clinton for using 
teleprompters and not “speak[ing] from the heart . . . 
and brain,” as he did). At other times, he used full-on 
assaults.  For example, in an October rally in Cincinnati, 
he called Clinton a “corrupt person,” asserting that 
“She should be locked up” and that, when he became 
President, “I will ask my Attorney General to look into 
her crimes.”
By the end of her campaign, Clinton’s followers had 
also accumulated a fair number of clothing-worthy 
slogans and images (“I’m with her,” “Hillary 2016 
[with an image of Rosie the Riveter],” “Clinton-Kane,” 
and, perhaps, most provocatively, “Nasty Woman”) 
and poster-worthy (“USA,” “Stronger Together,” “I 
Will Vote,” “Clinton-Kane,” and “Love Trumps Hate”) 
slogans.  
Clinton was fairly good at tooting her own horn, but, 
in doing so—as when she suggested she’d demonstrated 
her endurance by standing next to Trump for over four 
and a half hours during three debates—she sometimes 
4 Cincinnatus, a patrician in the early Roman Republic, was reputedly 
begged by his fellow citizens to give up his retirement as a farmer, assume 
complete control of the state, and vanquish an invading enemy.  After he 
did all this, Cincinnatus is said to have walked away from public life for 
good.
seemed slightly defensive.  Trump had, after all, accused 
her of not having sufficient energy for the presidency. 
Perhaps trying to avoid the appearance of self-
aggrandizement that Trump more clearly embraced, 
Clinton sometimes seemed more comfortable having 
surrogates sing her praises.  Barack Obama did this at 
the Democratic National Convention in July, and at 
other rallies during the campaign, when he said that 
“there has never been a man or a woman—not me, not 
Bill, nobody—more qualified than Hillary Clinton to 
serve as president of the United States of America.” 
Other surrogates pointed to specific issues on which 
Clinton was “on the side of the angels” while Trump 
was on the opposite side.  In a Miami rally in October, 
for example, Al Gore claimed, “[W]hen it comes to the 
most urgent issue facing this country and the world, 
Hillary Clinton will make solving the climate crisis a top 
national priority.  Her opponent, based on ideas he has 
presented, would take us toward a climate catastrophe.” 
In Manchester, New Hampshire near the end of the 
campaign, Elizabeth Warren observed, “Hillary is ready 
to fight for us.  Are you willing to fight for Hillary?” 
At a North Carolina rally in October, Michelle Obama 
had many positive things to say about Clinton.  One 
comment that was uniquely her own was: “First Ladies, 
we rock!”  Surrogates like the Obamas, Warren and 
Gore sometimes seemed to assume the role of disciples, 
preaching Clinton’s worthiness for high office.  They 
often shared the stage, with Clinton while she would 
simply nod her head in agreement.
These shared appearances meant that Clinton spent 
some time returning the favor, making her surrogates 
look a bit saintly, while hinting that her opponent was 
not.  Gore, she observed, had devoted much of his life 
fighting man-made climate change--had won, in fact, 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007.  She pointed out that 
Elizabeth Warren and Maggie Hassan (then governor of 
New Hampshire, campaigning to be New Hampshire’s 
next U.S. senator) “fight for you every day.”  But she also 
regularly tried to take luster from Trump’s candidacy. 
For example, in New Hampshire, Clinton stated that, 
while Trump claimed that he “knows more than the 
generals, I don’t think so!”  Thus did Clinton, somewhat 
like Trump, try to paint the election as an apocalyptic 
battle between, if not good and evil, then the qualified 
and the unqualified.
Rituals
The rituals evident at these rallies, at least as much 
as we saw of the rallies, were largely confined to music 
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played and crowd chants.  Trump usually walked to 
and from the stage, for example, accompanied by the 
national anthem, the “Battle Hymn of the Republic,” or, 
ironically, the London Bach Choir’s choral introduction 
to the Rolling Stones’ “You Can’t Always Get What 
you Want.”  The latter two, at least, might have given 
listeners the impression they were at a church service, 
rather than at a political gathering.  Clinton, too, 
might be introduced by the national anthem.  Just as 
frequently she would walk up to Journey’s “Don’t Stop 
Believin’ (Small Town Girl),” probably emphasizing her 
humble origins.  In later rallies, Clinton also walked 
out to “Brave,” by Sara Boreiles, a song that advocates 
“speakin’ up” to “someone’s lack of love.” 
For Trump, what had been simple “Trump, Trump, 
Trump” chants and “Who’s going to pay for the 
Wall”/”Mexico” call and responses in January at Rock 
Hill morphed, by October and November, into many 
iterations of “Lock Her Up,” “Drain the Swamp,” “USA,” 
“All Talk No Action,” “Build the Wall,” “Jobs, Jobs, Jobs.” 
By the end, Trump was sharing information about 
his part in the creation of such mantras.  At a rally in 
Phoenix, Arizona, on October 29th, for example, he 
asserted that when his people brought the “drain the 
swamp” concept to him, he didn’t like it at first, but 
admitted: “Now I like it.”
Clinton gave the impression of being less calculating 
about inspiring the chants that emerged from her 
galleries, but, since some of them, like “Deal Me In,” 
mimicked lines in her speeches (“Mr. Trump  accused 
me of playing the woman card. Well, if fighting for 
women’s health care and paid family leave and equal 
pay is playing the woman card, then deal me in”), she 
clearly had a hand in some of them.  In her later rallies, 
Clinton also gave her audiences time to chant this, as 
well as “Love Trumps Hate.”  Her crowds also, more 
spontaneously, chanted things like “Hillary, Hillary, 
Hillary,” and “We Love You, Hillary” at the later rallies. 
And, of course, when Michelle Obama spoke on Hillary’s 
behalf at various rallies, as she did at the Democratic 
Convention, crowds would often join in when she said, 
“When they go low, we go high.” 
Trump’s and Clinton’s responses to crowd chants 
were noticeably different.  Both candidates would 
typically pause to acknowledge the participation, but 
Trump would happily stop what he was saying and walk 
around the stage, looking at and pointing to various 
crowd members, seemingly egging them on.  On the 
other hand, while Clinton would usually stop, smile, 
and occasionally would seemingly admonish the crowd 
for getting off topic.  She noticeably did the latter at 
her joint rally with Al Gore, when she cut the crowd 
short by raising her open hand, as if to say “Stop,” and 
continued with, “This is really important.” 
Beliefs
One of the most daunting stumbling blocks in 
Cottingham’s (2015) observational study of Pittsburgh 
Steeler fans was that observation alone is a tricky guide 
to understanding people’s, especially football fans’ 
beliefs.  Without being able to ask questions of those 
being observed, the researcher cannot be sure of what 
they hold dear.  Observing film of political rallies, on 
the other hand, provided us with a more reliable way 
of determining what convictions motivated candidates 
and, presumably, their followers.  However, in this 
section, we augment our observations with data from 
the American National Election in 2016 to help 
determine how much Trump and Clinton followers did 
indeed differ in their beliefs.
As good researchers know, the validity of what a 
person says depends, among other things, on how 
deeply s/he believes in what is being said and whether 
s/he intends to be truthful (Adler and Clark, 2015: 215). 
Thus, the fact that Trump criticized other candidates for 
using a teleprompter in January 2016 rallies, and then 
used them himself in October and November rallies, 
may not be an indicator of Trump’s flock’s changing 
beliefs about teleprompters.  Rather, one might conclude 
that his flock’s faith in him, not his stated beliefs, could 
withstand such mild contradictions.  In fact, at a Sioux 
City, Iowa, rally in January 2016, Trump famously said: 
“I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue and shoot 
somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any voters, OK?”  Yet 
there did seem to be some fundamental beliefs shared 
by Trump and his followers--beliefs that forged the 
loyal bond.
Trump announced his candidacy on June 16, 2015, 
and simultaneously announced his commitment to 
building a wall between Mexico and the United States. 
In doing so, he laid the foundation of his campaign on 
an anti-immigrant theme that struck a chord for many 
Americans (e.g., Rocha, Sabetta and Clark, 2017).  Trump 
reiterated this theme at all the rallies we observed.  This, 
plus the promise to bring and hold onto well-paying jobs 
for the working class Americans, may well account for 
the ironclad loyalty that seems to have bound Trump to 
around 40 percent of American voters both before the 
election and since.  Some of Trump’s proposed policy 
changes were related to these two themes or goals 
(e.g., abandoning trade agreements like NAFTA and 
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the TPP, developing the country’s infrastructure, and 
cutting business taxes).  Some proposed policies were 
less clearly so (e.g., rebuilding the military, taking care 
of law enforcement and veterans, saving the Second 
Amendment, appointing Justices to the Supreme 
Court “that will uphold the Constitution,” and ending 
Common Core).  The belief in the salience of limiting 
immigration and creating jobs seems to have been 
crucial, almost sacred, to Trump and his followers.  
Towards the end of the campaign Clinton regularly 
argued that the government should not be making 
money off students (via high interests on loans) and 
that college and university should be tuition free for 
students whose families made under $125,000 a year. 
She also advocated raising the minimum wage, taxing 
millionaires and corporations, and an infrastructure 
enhancement program that would provide jobs. 
However, much of Clinton’s eventual position was 
defined in contradiction to Trump’s nativist stance 
and, more generally, in contradiction to his messages 
of exclusivity.  In a rally in Grand Rapids, Michigan the 
day before the election, she said simply: “Anger is not a 
plan.” She also said that the election was about choosing 
between “division and unity in our country.”  
Based on candidates’ expressed beliefs, one can derive 
certain inferences about their followers’ probable beliefs 
as well.  However, enthusiastic responses by rally goers, 
conceivably the most fervid followers, may not translate 
into patterned differences in the beliefs of the candidates’ 
followers.  Using American National Election Study 
(ANES) data, we were able to determine that they 
often did.  Based on their candidates’ statements, one 
might expect that Trump voters would be more averse 
to immigration than Clinton voters.  The ANES data 
suggest that, in general, they were.  Table 1 compares 
Trump and Clinton voters in terms of their openness 
to immigration.  The ANES asked respondents:  “What 
should immigration levels be?”  Almost 46 percent 
(45.7%) of people who voted for Trump said they should 
be “decreased a lot,” while only 8.8 percent of Clinton 
voters said this.  Conversely, 10.9 percent of Clinton 
voters said that immigration levels should be increased 
a lot, while only 1.7 percent of Trump voters said they 
should.  (See Table 1.)
Table 1. Trump and Clinton Voters Answer the Question:
 “What Should Immigration Levels Be?” 
Response Options Trump Voters        Clinton Voters
Increased a lot          1.7%  10.9%
           (19)  (136)
Increased a little                2.7%  16.5%
           (30)  (205)
Left the same          25.9%  50.1%
           (290)  (623)
Decreased a little         24.0%  13.6%
           (269)  (169)
Decreased a lot          45.7%   8.8%
           (513)  (109)
Total           100%  100%
           (1121)  (1242)
Source: American National Election Study, 2016.   Note: Ns 
are in parentheses.
 
Regarding increasing the minimum wage, one might 
also expect that Clinton voters would be more likely 
than Trump voters to have supported it.  The data in 
Table 2 show that they were.  Specifically, 83.5 percent 
of Clinton voters favored raising the minimum wage, 
while only 45.0 percent of Trump voters did.  (See Table 
2.)
The ANES data revealed other substantial differences 
between Trump and Clinton voters registered. 
Regarding favoring raising taxes on millionaires, a 
large majority (84.9%) of Clinton voters approved.  In 
contrast, less than half (47.8%) of Trump voters did so. 
More than half (56.4%) of Trump voters responded that 
immigration was extremely or very likely to “take away 
jobs,” while only 18.9% of Clinton voters felt this way. 
The ANES did not ask questions that allowed tests of 
expected differences in attitudes on all beliefs professed 
by the candidates; but the tests that were possible did 
suggest that the beliefs of Trump and Clinton voters were 
so different that these voters seemed almost to belong to 
two different, perhaps rival, churches.  For an empirical 
account of other attitudes and beliefs that differentiated 
Trump and Clinton voters, we refer readers to an article 
that appeared in volume three of Sociology between the 
Gaps (Rocha, Sabetta and Clark 2017).
Trump and Clinton Rallies: Are Political Campaigns Quasi-Religious in Nature? 7
Table 2. Trump and Clinton Voters’ Answers to the Question:
“Should the Minimum Wage be Raised?”
      
Response Options Trump Voters        Clinton Voters
Raised          45.0%  83.5%
          (502)               (1046)
Kept the same         45.4%  14.5%
          (506)  (181)
Lowered          2.7%   0.6%
           (30)    (8)
Eliminated          6.9%  1.4%
           (77)  (18)
Total           100%  100%
           (1114)  (1252)
Source: American National Election Study, 2016.  Note: Ns 
are in parentheses.
CONCLUSION
Our analysis examined sacred objects, rituals and 
beliefs in the 2016 presidential campaigns of Donald 
Trump and Hillary Clinton.  It provides insight into how 
aspects of a campaign’s culture undergo sacralization 
to greater or lesser degrees.  We see, for example, how 
surrogates like Bobby Knight and the Obamas labored 
to turn Trump and Clinton, respectively, into sacred 
objects.  We also see how Trump worked to make 
himself look Cincinnatus-like, if not divine.  
The rituals we observed in the campaigns also struck 
us as differentially sacralized, or at least subject to 
differential attempts to seem religious in nature.  In the 
“Battle Hymn of the Republic” and the London Bach 
Choir’s introduction to the Rolling Stones’ “You Can’t 
Always Get What You Want,” someone in the Trump 
campaign was certainly trying to create a sacred air 
to the candidate’s comings and goings.  It’s not clear 
whether or not the version of “Battle Hymn” is the one 
sung by the Mormon Tabernacle choir in the Mormon 
Tabernacle; but, it could have been.  The London Bach 
Choir’s introduction to the Stone’s song was clearly 
designed to echo inspirational classical chorale music. 
In using “Don’t Stop Believin’ (Small Town Girl)” and 
“Brave” to introduce Clinton, much more secular foci 
were evoked. 
Evidently, Trump took pride in the chants that 
constituted notable ritualized activities on the part of 
his supporters at his rallies.  As soon as a “Lock Her 
Up” or “Build the Wall” chant would begin, he would 
typically stop whatever he was saying and walk around. 
He often turned to the people behind him and let the 
chanting behavior run its course.  Trump took credit 
for giving his stamp of approval to some chants, such as 
“Drain the Swamp.”  Clinton would frequently stop and 
smile in reaction to a “Hillary, Hillary, Hillary” chant, 
but, as we have mentioned, she actually discouraged 
crowd participation at a rally about climate change.  
The beliefs espoused by the candidates, at least as 
evidenced in the rallies we watched, often seemed fairly 
fundamental, maybe even sacred in their nature and 
presentation.  Of course (in Grand Rapids, Michigan) we 
observed throwaway ideas, especially, for example, from 
Trump, about the value of not using teleprompters.   But 
about his two fundamental themes, he was consistent, if, 
given his background, apparently at odds with his own 
historical interests: the needs to limit immigration and 
to provide well-paying jobs.   According to Ballesteros 
(2017), Trump is thought to have used immigrant 
labor to save money on the construction of Trump 
Tower.  Clinton’s fundamental beliefs are less easy to 
summarize or, perhaps, too numerous to do so quickly. 
Clinton frequently suggested to crowds that they look 
for her policy positions on her website: a site that 
enumerated positions on forty-one issues ranging from, 
alphabetically, “A Fair Tax System” to “Workforce Skills 
and Job Training.”   Our analysis of ANES data indicates 
that, to the extent that we could measure them, the 
belief systems of voters for Trump and Clinton were 
very different.
In general, then, both campaigns evinced, through 
their rallies, elements of quasi-religions, although they 
did so to differing degrees.  Donald Trump’s campaign 
seemed most clearly to embrace quasi-religiousness. 
Many of Trump’s followers wore the red baseball cap 
with the “Make America Great Again” logo and this was 
by far the most obvious “thing” that followers sacralized 
in the campaigns.  Trump seemed not at all averse to 
defining himself, and being defined, as a sacred object. 
And the rituals that played out at his rallies were, while 
varied, strongly encouraged and almost sacramental 
in nature.  Hilary Clinton seemed more reluctant to 
embrace the sacralization of her campaign, although 
she did not reject it entirely.
In concluding this article, we would like to report 
that we did an analysis of five Bernie Sanders rallies to 
get added perspective on our findings.  Perhaps because 
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of the shorter length of his campaign, Sanders followers 
never seemed to amass the collection of sacred objects 
that both Trump and Clinton supporters did, nor were 
their ritualized chants anywhere near as insistent as 
those of Trump and Clinton rally attendees.  Part of the 
reason for the relative absence of these elements of quasi-
religion may be understood by Sanders’ discouragement 
of them.  Even more than Clinton, Sanders seemed 
to disapprove of ritualized behavior.  He would, for 
example, raise what seemed to be a warning hand when 
his followers began to chant, “Bernie, Bernie, Bernie.” 
Even more than Clinton, Sanders gave the impression 
that he wanted to get back to his presentation.  This 
behavior may either be taken as evidence that his 
campaign had fewer religious elements than the other 
two candidates or that what Sanders really valued were 
the beliefs (not the objects or rituals) of his campaign.
Limitations of the Current Study
The current study has several significant limitations. 
First, we could have focused on other 2016 U. S. 
presidential candidate campaigns.  However, the Trump 
and Clinton campaigns were the ones of the most likely 
candidates to have won in 2016.  Second, the degree to 
which our findings may be generalized to other political 
campaigns in American politics is unclear.  It is possible 
that the sacred objects, rituals and beliefs described here 
may (in some generic way) be generalizable to other 
campaigns in American history.  Indeed, they may be 
generalizable, in generic ways, to campaigns going on 
in other nations, both in the contemporary period and 
in the past.  However, some specifics, like those in any 
exploratory study, will not be generalizable.   
Third, a major limitation of the current study is 
its focus on easily accessible recordings of political 
rallies.  There are not only a variety of biases that may 
account for variation in what off-site observers of such 
rallies see.  Editing, the placement of cameras and the 
interests of the camerapersons are factors which limit 
the coverage of the videos of rallies.  It is also likely 
that rallies themselves offer only limited access to the 
variety of ways in which political campaigns play out 
as quasi-religious movements, or not.  To the extent 
that a campaign’s quasi-religiousness can account 
for the intensity of its participants’ commitment to a 
candidate, it may be very useful for future research to 
further outline what it takes for political campaigns to 
encourage a kind of religious fervor. 
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